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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Notice and Opportunity for HearingTax Assessment Statute
It is a fundamental concept of constitutional law that a person shall
-not be deprived of his property without due process of law. 1 Notice
and an opportunity for a hearing are essential to due process. As
applied to the field of taxation the same principle obtains, but it is obvious that what constitutes adequate notice and hearing in a strict
judicial sense is not necessarily the form that is required in view of
the exigencies of taxation. Accordingly the rule of general application
is that the taxpayer, at some point before the assessment becomes
irrevocably fixed, must be apprised of it and must have an opportunity
to be heard as to its validity and amount.2 The Supreme Court of the
United States in construing this principle has held it does not require
notice before the original assessment is made.3 While some of the
court's language would seem to require the notice to be provided for in
1U.
S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV §1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
N. C. CONST. Art. I §17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."
2 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S.
234 (1923) ; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 (1918) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906); Weyerhauser v. Minnesota, 176 U. S.
550 (1899); Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701 (1883); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877) ; State Tax Commission v. Bailey &
Howard, 179 Ala. 620, 60 So. 913 (1912); Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74
P. 2d 47 (1937) ; People v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d 349, 115 P. 2d 488 (1941) ; Town
of West Hartford v. Coleman, 88 Conn. 78, 89 Atl. 1120 (1914) ;: Jones v. City
of Arcadia, 147 Fla. 571, 3 So. 2d 338 (1941); Anderson v. City of Ocala, 67
Fla. 204, 64 So. 775 (1914); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S. E. 2d 328
(1939) ; Barnett v. Cook County, 388 Ill. 251, 57 N. E. 2d 873 (1944) ; Chicago
& N. W. Ry. v. Board of Sup'rs of Hamilton County, 182 Iowa' 60, 162 N. W.
868, on rehearing, 165 N. W. 390 (1917) ; Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County
v. Wright, 153 Kan. 19, 109 P. 2d 184 (1941); Draffen v. City of Paducah, 215
Ky. 139, 284 S. W. 1027 (1926) ; State v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 188 La.
978, 178 So. 601 (1937); Henry v. Manzella, 356 Mo. 305, 201 S. W. 2d 457
(1947) ; Thomas v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 192 Okla. 409, 136 P. 2d 929 (1943) ;
Oblon County v. Coulter, 153 Tenn. 469, 284 S. W. 372 (1924) ; Texas Pipe Line
v. Anderson, 100 S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. 1937) ; Elkins v. Millard County Drainage
District No. 3, 77 Utah 303, 294 P. 307 (1930) ; Clark v. City of Burlington, 101
Vt. 391, 143 Atl. 677 (1928) ; Snohomish County v. Andrews, 144 Wash. 320, 259
P. 851 (1927).
' Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S.
234 (1923) ; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165 (1918) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906).
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the tax statute,4 later cases have held that it is sufficient for due process
if the taxpayer has the right to contest the tax in an action for its
collection or in a suit to enjoin the taxY In short, so long as the taxpayer can present his case as a matter of right, before the court, whether
by the tax statute, a separate statute, or by the holdings of the court,
he has been afforded due process of law even though he had no notice
and hearing before the tax authorities. 6
In the case of Bowuie v. Town of West Jefferson" the Supreme

Court of North Carolina had an opportunity to consider specifically
what were the requirements of due process concerning a statute relating
to real property evaluation and taxation. The Town of West Jefferson
undertook to revalue the property within its corporate limits pursuant
to authority to do so conferred upon itself and another town by Chapter
627, Session Laws, 1947. Previously the municipality had used the
valuation placed thereon by the county authorities, namely $9,674.00. 8
The new valuation 'determined by the town through its newly created
board of assessment was $72,379.00. The municipal authorities had in
fact given the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard but the
statute under which they acted did not require them to do so. The
taxpayer paid the town tax under protest and made a written demand
for the return of the difference between what he paid and what the tax
would have been upon the valuation set by the county. Upon the town's
refusal, the taxpayer brought suit under N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-406
(1943).9 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, ruled the statute under
'Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907).
'Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.
234 (1923).
'Security Trust v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906); Pittsburgh & Ry
Board of Public Works of West Virginia, 172 U. S. 32 (1898); Hagar
District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884) ; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
Reclamation
(1877).
( 231 N. C. 408, 57 S. E. 2d 369 (1950).

S.

v.
v.
37

8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-333 (1943) says: . . . All cities and towns not
situated in more than one county shall accept the valuations fixed by the county
authorities, as modified by the state board of assessment. . .
N. C. GN. STAT. §105-406 (1943): "Unless a tax or assessment, or some
part thereof, be illegal or invalid, or be levied or' assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, no injunction shall be granted by any court or judge to restrain the collection thereof in whole or in part, nor to restrain the sale of any
property for the nonpayment thereof; nor shall any court issue any order in claim
or delivery proceedings or otherwise for the taking of any personalty levied on by
the sheriff to enforce payment of such tax or assessment against the owner thereof.
Whenever any person shall claim to have a valid defense to the enforcement of a
tax or assessment charged or assessed upon his property or poll, such person
shall pay such tax or assessment to the sheriff; but if at the time of such paymernt, he shall notify the sheriff in wvriting that he pays the same under protest,
such payment shall be without prejudice to any defenses or rights he may have in
the premises, and he may, at any time within thirty days after such payment,
demand the same in writing from the treasurer of the state, ot of the county, city,
or town, for the benefit or under the authority or by the request of which the
same was levied; and if the same shall not be refunded within ninety days there-
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which the town acted unconstitutional as denying due process. The
supreme court affirmed saying that a statute which creates a board to
evaluate property for tax purposes must also provide the procedure by
which notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded the taxpayer.
The court ignores the fact that the protesting taxpayer had been before
a trial court of general jurisdiction where his grievances could have been
heard and his rights protected pursuant to the statute under which the
action was brought.
In Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith ° the county officials as
permitted by statute listed personal assets where the taxpayer had
omitted them. The taxpayer sought an injunction complaining that he
had not been given any notice or opportunity to be heard on the assessment. The statute made no provision for notice or opportunity to be
heard at any time. The trial judge made no findings of fact but continued the injunction until final hearing. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina in affirming this order asserted as to the lack of notice: "We
are clearly of the opinion that either the assessment is void and should
be so declared or that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to contest all the questions in the court which would have been open to it if
notice had been given at the inception of the matter." The court further
suggested that the legislature consider amending the statute to provide
for notice to the taxpayer. However, all the court decided in the
absence of any finding of fact by the trial judge was that the injunction
be continued. On a later appeal of the same case it was held that since
the taxpayer had been given a hearing in the court below his objection
to lack of notice was no longer valid."'
In Kinston v. Loftin12 the municipal authorities proceeded under a
statute which provided for a special assessment but made no provision
for notice to the taxpayer. The statute did, however, provide that the
city could bring action for the collection of the assessment and that in
such suit the taxpayer could raise any defense available to him.' 3 The
board of aldermen gave no notice or opportunity for the taxpayer to
appear before them until after the assessment was made. The court
after, may sue such county, city, or town for the amount so demanded, including
in his action against the county both state and county tax; and if upon the trial
it shall be determined that such tax or any part thereof was levied or assessed
for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or was for any reason invalid or excessive,
"
For similar statute see N. C. GEN.
judgment shall be rendered therefore ...
STAT. §105-267 (1943).
10 146 N. C. 199, 59 S. E. 653 (1907).
" Caldwell Land and Lumber Co. v. Smith, 151 N. C. 70, 65 S. E. 641 (1909).
a' 149 N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1069 (1908).
"

Private Laws 1905, c. 338 which said taxpayer

"...

shall have the right to

deny the whole, or any part, of the amount claimed to be due by the city, and to
plead any irregularity in reference to the assessment or any fact relied upon, to
question the legality of the assessment, and the issues raised shall be tried, and the
cause disposed of according to law. .. ."
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held that the opportunity afforded by the statute to contest the assessment in the suit for collection satisfied the requirements of due process. 14
While the cases of Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith and
Kinston v. Loftin appear to follow the rule that a hearing provided at
any stage whether before the court or the taxing authority constitutes
due process, later North Carolina cases tend to introduce some confusion
into our law. In Markham v. Carvzer'5 the State Tax Commission had
raised the value of personal property reported by the taxpayer. It was
held that the assessment could not be increased without notice and a
hearing as this was a denial of due process. The court, however, did
not consider whether the hearing could be had before the court apart
from the provisions of the tax statute. The decision would seem to
indicate that the opportunity afforded for a hearing must be before the
taxing authorities.
Likewise in Lexington v. Lopp in a per curiam opinion, 18 a special
assessment statute was held unconstitutional because the statute made
no sufficient provision for notice and an opportunity to be heard. It
would seem that the latter decisions and the principal case have concerned themselves solely with the question whether the assessment
statute provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
taxing authorities. They have omitted idiscussion of whether any
method existed under our law apart from the statute itself for the
parties to get a hearing on the assessment. Nor have they considered
whether the hearing may be before a court as well as before the taxing
authority. While these cases might seem to indicate that the requirements of due process were more stringent in North Carolina than in
other jurisdictions, actually they tend to introduce obscurity into our
body of law. It would be desirable for statutes to provide for notice
and an opportunity for a hearing before the taxing authorities for they
are the expert bodies which should make an initial decision after hearing. Where no such statutory provision is made, our court is not
clear on whether notice and hearing provided by another statute, or
required by court decision, as part of the process of judicial review, is
sufficient.
KENNETH R. HOYLE.
For case involving the same statute, see Kinston v. Wooten, 150 N. C. 295,

63 S. E. 1061 (1909) ; a similar statute, see Tarboro v. Staton, 156 N. C. 504, 72
S. E. 577 (1911).
188 N. C. 615, 125 S. E. 409- (1924).
1C210 N. C. 196, 185 S. E. 766 (1936).

